美军记录的松山战斗(中英文对照)


blueski推荐 [2011-10-30]
出处:来自网上
作者:戈叔亚翻译
 

THE BATTLE FOR SUNG SHAN

美军记录的松山战斗(原文)

 
 
US ARMY IN WOORD WAR II
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER
STILWELL’S COMMAND PROBLEMS
PART THREE
COMMAND PROBLEMS IN CHINA THEATER
XI. THE CHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE
X. FACING THE COMMAND PROBLEM
THE BATTLE FOR SUNG SHAN
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-CBI-Command/USA-CBI-Command-10.html
 
 
 
The Battle for Sung Shan
Since the Chinese attempt to cut the center out of the Japanese position on the Salween by taking Lung-ling had failed, the attention of the Chinese commanders had shifted from Lung-ling to Sung Shan.(75) The hill mass of Sung shan dominated the area where the Burma Road cross the Salween and so barred the direct approach from China down the Burma Road. The Chinese had invested it with a containing force in their initial drive on Lung-ling. That drive had been supplied by air, and now that the Chinese were stalled between Lung-ling and Sung Shan, air supply was not too adequate, and clearing the Japanese from Sung Shan appeared essential.
(77: In addition to the Y-FOX Journal, Y-FOX 1944 Historical Report, Japanese Study 93, and Japanese Officers’ Comments, sources consulted for this section are: (1) Rpt, Col Carlos G. Spaht, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 8th Army, to Dorn, 29 Jul 44. AG (Y-FOS) 319.1. (2) Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La., 1 Oct 48. (3) Of the six Chinese Armies to participated in the Salween campaign, the 8th Army prepared the only detailed and frank account of its role. Theis translated history, including tactical maps, is among the papers of Colonel Spaht. (4) Ltrs, Spaht to authors, 24 May, 29 Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47, OCHM.)
 
Sung Shan (the name Pine Mountain applies to its highest peak) is an intricate hill-mass rising to 3,000 feet above the Salween gorge. It is roughly triangular in shape. The Burma Road, in climbing out of the Salween gorge, runs along the northeast side of the triangle, angles sharply round its northern tip, then runs back down along the northwest side of the triangle. In all, thirty-six miles of the Burma Road were dominated by the Japanese guns on Sung Shan. Time did not permit building a cutoff road to bypass Sung Shan. The Japanese defensive system, manned by some 1,200 men under Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu, was built around elements of the 113th Infantry, supported by a battalion of mountain artillery, some transport troops, and some tansport troops, and some engineers. Of the 1,200, only 900 were effective.
 
In June, during the containing phase, the Chinese had assembled seven 150-mm. howitzers, two 75-mm. howitzers, and two 76-mm. field guns. Later joined by some pack artillery, and directed by an American artillery observer in a liaison plane, the Chinese cannoneers dueled with Major Kanemitsu’s gunners. Finally, the Japanese howitzers ceased to fire on the Burma Road Engineers and the Chinese who were preparing to rebuild the Burma Road bridge over the Salween. Now safe, the engineers proceeded with their rebuilding. During theis same containing phase, the Chinese New 28th and New 39th Divisions had made attacks in regimental strength against Sung Shan. On 15 June, they succeeded in taking a peak at the southeast corner of the triangle, but failed to take its twin at the southwest corner, two miles away. Other Chinese attempts failed, though heavy casualties were taken in the attempt.
 
As the period of containment merged into one of preparation for all-out attack, General Wei’s hand was strengthened by the arrival of the 8th Army (the Honorable 1st, the 82d, and 103d Divisions). Originally stationed on the Indochina border, it had begun to arrive in battalion increments at the time of the Chinese seback at Lung-ling. The 8th Army had some lend-lease equipment, but only two thirds of its officers had been exposed to Y-FOS training efforts. The relief of the New 28th Division by the 3d Infantry, Honorable 1st Division, on 27 June was not well co-ordinated, for the Japanese were able to reoccupy the positions the New 28th Division had taken in June. Japanese also filtered through the Chinese lines to reinforce Sung Shan, and as further evidence of Japanese determination, on 28 June Japanese aircraft, three fighters, and two transports circled Sung Shan and made a supply drop, some of which fell in the Chinese lines.
 
Accompanied by Y-FOS personnel under command of Col. Carlos G. Spaht, the 8th Army assembled east and south of Sung Shan and set 5 July for the attack. The Chinese artillery fired a nightlong preparation, and at dawn of 5 July two Chinese regiments attacked but not in strength. A few positions were overrun, the Japanese counterattacked, and at nightfall the Chinese were back in their initial position, minus seventy dead. Colonel Spaht reported to Dorn that teamwork between the demolition squads and the assault teams had left much to be desired, that further training was badly needed.
 
The 8th Army’s next attempt was made by the 246th Regiment the night of 7-8 July. It was directed against the southwest corner of the triangle and surprised the Japanese defenders of Kung Lung-po peak. By midnight the Chinese had all Japanese strongpoints in their hands, but shortly after midnight the Japanese counterattacked over that was for them familiar terrain and drove off the 246th regiment, inflicting more than 200 casualties. Y-FOS’observers reported that the Chinese grew quite confused during the night fighting and often shot at one another. The 246th Regiment had to be replaced by the 207th Regiment. The 307th faced what was for them a new Japanese defensive tactic between 10 and 12 July. Since the Chinese in climbing up the hills tended to bunch along the easies routes to the top, the Japanese used their machine guns to keep the Chinese huddled down in the natural cover the hill afforded, then hurled grenades and mortar shells into the parties of Chinese. Such tactics were of deadly efficiency, and so the 8th Army brought up another regiment to reinforce the battered 207th.
 
Two weeks passed before the 8th Army again essayed an attack on Sung Shan. This time, instead of piecemeal attacks by a regiment or two, 8th Army prepared the attack by moving its howitzers up to pound Japanese positions at from 1,500-3,200 yards with direct fire. When the Chinese attacked with three regiments, on the morning of 23 July, the division commander of the 103d personally directed the 75-mm. fire, and on occasion placed shells twenty-five to forty feet in front of the assaulting Chinese. Captured Japanese diaries contained praise of the artillery and of the 103d Division’s valiant infantry. This well-led, co-ordinated attack succeeded and dawn the Chinese were in Japanese positions almost at the crests of the two peaks Kung Lung-po and Tayakou. Alarmed by the successful Chinese artillery fire, Major Kanemitsu on 26 July pleaded for Japanese air support to attack the Chinese batteries, which had been emplaced in the open to use direct fire. Japanese fighters promptly responded, and machine-gunned the Chinese cannon and crews. The damage plus the moral effect halted the Chinese attack for a week, until 3 August.
 
When the 308th Regiment resumed the advance on 3 August in had blame throwers which it used with devastating effect to take the crest of Kung Lung-po. There the Chinese found several Japanese tankettes, which had been dug in for use as pillboxes. When the Japanese failed to make their usual prompt counterattack Y-FOS personnel surmised they might be short of ammunition. This was so, and Major Kenemitsu decided to raid the 8th Army’s artillery positions and supply dumps to replenish his supply. Seven parties of Japanese volunteers truck during the night of 9 August, destroying several howitzers and taking away all the light weapons and ammunition they could carry.
 
At this time, Burmeses civilians, who had been jmpressed into the Japanese service as laborers and who were found hiding in Japanese dugouts, estimated that Kanemitsu had 700 men, most of them wounded or starving. Actually, he now had but 300, including sick and wounded.
 
Having tried attacks by night, during rainstorms, and by surprise, none of which had quite succeeded and all of which had taken precious time, the Chinese now decided on a return to more formal siegecraft. With technical advice from Y-FOS engineers, the Chinese on 11 August began digging under what seemed the key to the Japanese positions that remained in the Sung Shan triangle. Significant of the closeness of the fighting, the tunnels needed to be but twenty-two feet long to put the mines in place under the Japanese pillboxes. One mine held 2,500 pounds of TNT, the other 3,500 pounds.
 
The mines were fired on 20 August at 0905 and the resulting destruction was quickly exploited by engineers armed with flame throwers. In one pillbox forty-two Japanese were buried alive, of whom five were rescued. The prisoners stated that they had been asleep and had never suspected that they were being undermined. At 0920 the 3d Regiment against light opposition took the few strongpoints that remained on Sung Shan proper. Kanemitsu’s men still held out in scattered pockets about the triangle. These launched desperate counter-attacks on 21 and 22 August. That of the 22d produced particularly bloody fighting in which the Chinese lost many company grade officers.
 
After the failure of these counterattacks there was nothing left but mopping up. Actually, since the completion of the new Salween bridge on 18 august and the mine blast on the 21st, the rest was anticlimax, even Major Kanemitsu’s death on 6 September, and the macabre ceremony the next day when the Japanese burned their colors and slew their wounded. Of the 1,200 Japanese on and around Sung Shan, 9 were captured, and 10 were believed to have escaped. The significance of Sung Shan lay in that it had cost the Chinese 7,675 dead to clear that block from the Burma Road, of which some 5,000 were from the 8th Army, leaving it but two understrength regiments fit to fight for Lung-ling.
 
Summary
As August waned, the Generalissimo was committed “in principle” to given Stilwell command in China. Events along the Salween did not suggest there would be any speedy relief for China by a victory on that front, while in east China the Japanese had not as yet met effective resistance. Delay in breaking the blockade of China and in setting up an effective barrier to Operation IGHIGO in east China meant still further deterioration in China’s military and political situation. Defeats in the field place great strain on coalitions; events on the Salween and south of Changsha would be felt as far away as Washington.
翻译:戈叔亚
 
 
       自从中国人试图直捣怒江战线的中心龙陵的战斗失败以后,中国指挥官就将注意力从龙陵转移到了松山。松山是由许多个山头组成,位于怒江西岸的滇缅公路旁边,(由于松山有日军把守),这样就直接阻止了中国试图利用公路的用意。中国人在这里投入了大量兵力,包括开始在龙陵方面作战的部队。这些部队都是由空投来提供给养和装备,由于这些中国部队是在松山和龙陵之间,(公路被松山日军切断),所以仅仅空投是不够的,必须将在松山的日本军清除掉。 
 
 
 
 
松山(中文意思是长满松树的山)是坐落在怒江峡谷的一座海拔3,000英尺(海拔1800米。译注)的地形复的群山。从地图上看大约是一个不等边的三角形。缠绕在怒江峡谷之间的滇缅公路,从这个三角形的东北慢慢到了正北面形成尖角,然后沿着西北下滑。日本军在松山控制的滇缅公路大约有36英里。时间不允许再修一条绕过松山的公路。日本人的防御系统是在金光惠次郎少校(Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu)指挥下的1,200名士兵,是第113联队的基本部队,并得到了一个山地炮兵营、一些运输部队和一些工程人员的支持。1,200人中,作战人员有900名。

pack artillery(57毫米)野炮。

 

        6月,怒江战役已经展开了一段时间,中国人使用150毫米榴弹炮7门、75毫米榴弹炮2门和76毫米野战炮2门对松山猛烈开火。以后一些马托的小炮(pack artillery)也参加炮击,这些炮兵得到了一名在观测飞机里的美国炮兵观测员的指示,这样中国炮兵和由金光惠次郎少校指挥的日本炮兵开始了较量。不久终于将日本炮兵给压制下去了。在滇缅公路上,工程人员和中国人开始重新修理跨越怒江的桥梁(惠通桥)。由于现在比较安全,工程人员可以从容工作。同时中国军新28师和新39师组织了团一级的对松山的攻势。6月15日,他们成功地攻占了这个三角形东南角的一个山头,但是他们在攻占两英里开外的西南角时却失败了。其他中国部队在付出了惨重代价后,攻势也失败了。

         在包围着松山准备着下一次的攻势时,由于第8军的到来,使卫立煌将军的兵力得到了加强。第8军下辖荣誉第一师、82师和103师,最初他们驻防在印度支那(滇越边境)边境。当中国军插到龙陵的背后时,他们就赶来增援。第8军有一些租借法案的装备,有三分之二的军官受过Y-FOS(中国远征军(Y部队)的美军顾问团。下同)的训练。由于这个军的荣誉第一师第三团赶来,减轻了新28师的压力,但是这个师在6月27日的一次失败的协同攻击后,日本人反而夺回了新28师在这个月不久前得到的地盘。同时日本人还渗透到了中国防线中来减轻松山的压力,为了进一步加强松山的阵地,6月28日日本飞机,3架战斗机和2架运输机来到松山盘旋并投掷物品,结果一部分落到了中国人的手里。
 
 
 
 
      
 
 

美军顾问团在远征军。注意看车上的Y-FOS标志

 

 

 
 

美军人员。左二为弗兰克·多恩。

 

 

 
在由Carlos G. Spaht上校指挥下的Y-FOS(美国中国远征军参谋团)人员的陪伴下,第8军于7月5日从东面和南面开始了对松山的进攻。中国的炮兵经过了彻夜的炮火装备,7月5日凌晨,两个团的中国部队开始了进攻。由于兵力不足,虽然部分日本人的阵地被占领,但是日本人马上组织反击,结果到了黄昏,中国人在损失了70多人的情况下,又回到了原来的阵地。Carlos G. Spaht上校向弗兰克·多恩(也称窦恩)准将报告,破坏班和偷袭小队之间的配合非常糟糕,要求这样的训练必须马上加强。
 

中国军队在松山的滚龙坡。

 

 

       7月7-8日,第8军组织了246团(一零三师)的进攻,这个攻势是在这个三角形的西南角进行,这个进攻使得这个叫做滚龙坡的日本守军感到惊讶。到了午夜,中国人几乎将所有的日本要点都拿了下来,但是就在这个午夜不久,日本人又开始在他们熟悉的地形开始反击,246团在伤亡了200多人后还是被赶了下来。Y-FOS的观察员报告说,中国人对于夜间战斗一个接着一个感到相当疑惑。所以246团不得不将阵地交给了307团。7月10日和12日,307团面对着的又是日本人新的防御战术。中国人一直都是成群地沿着容易上山的路线向山头发起攻击,日本人用他们的机关枪打得中国人一群群拥挤地到山头与山头之间的凹地躲避,然后日本人就向这些中国士兵投掷手榴弹和迫击炮弹。很遗憾,日本人这样的战术非常有效,结果第8军不得不再派另外一个团来增援遭受巨大损失的307团(103师)。
       在第8军开始攻击松山以来,两个星期过去了。现在,这样一个团或者两个团的攻击方式要改变,7月23日,军部将榴弹炮运到日本人阵地1,500-3,000码的距离内进行直接射击。而同时使用3个团的兵力组织进攻,103师师长指挥着75毫米的榴弹炮射击,有时候炮弹就在距离进攻中的中国士兵25-40码的前方爆炸。缴获的日本人的日记里有赞扬中国人的103师炮兵勇敢的记载。这是指挥很好、协同很好的成功的进攻,结果中国人几乎完全占领了滚龙坡和大垭口这两个日本人的山头阵地。7月26日,惊恐的金光惠次郎少佐要求日本战斗机来支援,要他们攻击中国人的炮兵阵地,这些大炮一直的没有隐蔽地露天放着进行直接射击。结果,日本人的战斗机马上做出了敏捷地反应,他们使用机关枪猛烈地扫射中国的炮兵。在8月3日之前,巨大的伤亡对中国人一个星期一直保持着的进攻的士气是一个打击。

坦克被击毁前。滚龙坡

 

 

 
 

松山保存的战车履带

 
滚龙坡上的日军坦克。

 

       当8月3日308团来增援重新组织进攻时,狠狠打击了日本人的投掷手,因为他们的破坏性很大,结果占领了滚龙坡最高点。在那里,中国人发现了几辆日本人的小坦克,这些小坦克是被放在挖掘的阵地内当作地堡用的。日本人一旦失败,会马上组织反击,Y-FOS的参谋人员猜想敌人的弹药一定短缺了。结果的确是这样,金光少佐决定奇袭第8军的炮兵阵地和供给品来补给自己。8月9日夜间,日本人组织了7个志愿敢死队,他们捣毁了一些榴弹炮并从阵地上拿走了他们可以拿走的轻武器和弹药。
 
        就在这个时候,有一些缅甸平民,他们被欺骗当劳工的,他们发现了躲藏日本士兵的防空洞,估计金光少佐只有700人,大部分还是伤兵和饿得要死的人。其实那个时候他仅仅只有300人,包括病号和伤员。

大爆破

 

 

        无论是夜间、还是雨天进攻,非常奇怪的是都没有成功,而且还浪费了宝贵的时间,这个时候中国人决定还是回到传统的围攻战术方式。在得到了Y-FOS技术人员的帮助下,8月11日中国人开始挖掘松山三角地带剩余的日本人的地盘的下面来解决战斗。重要的战斗在非常狭窄的地方进行,隧道需要挖掘22英尺长,就像矿井一样的挖掘到了日本人地堡的下方。其中一个坑道放置了2,500磅的TNT,另外一个是3,500磅。
 

关山阵地被击毁的日军兵舍

 

 

        8月20日上午0905,坑道爆破开始,随着工程人员点火爆炸后,火焰喷射器手开始发射。在一个地堡里,有22个日本人被活埋,其中有5个被中国人救了出来。俘虏说他们正在睡觉,从没有想到他们这样的下场。0920分,第3团(荣誉第三团)迎着火光冲了上去,借着爆破的优势完全占领了松山剩余的地区。金光少佐的士兵仍旧把持着三角形的一些零散的阵地。战斗持续到8月21-22日。特别是22日的战斗极为残酷,中国人损失了许多连级军官。
 
 

日军最后阵地被克复。

 

        日本人在经过了徒劳的反击后,已经没有力量再对抗了。实际上,自从8月18日怒江上新的大桥完成,和大爆炸后的8月21日,日本人的败局就决定了,接着金光少佐是在9月6日死亡,第二天,日本人以烧毁他们的军旗和伤员残酷的自杀为他们最后的典礼。在松山的1,200名日本士兵当中,仅仅只有9人被俘,10名估计已经逃跑,其他的全部阵亡。中国人以损失(牺牲)7,675人的代价换取了打通滇缅公路。在死亡的中国人中,有5,000名是第8军的,剩下仅仅只有两个兵力不足的团转移到龙陵作战。

 

云南抓获的日军俘虏。

 

 

 

中国军队缴获的113联队的关防。上面写着:

 
关防上写着:龙六七三四部队。
一九四四、八、一三、松山之役我军冲入敌之一一三联队司令部即(龙六七三四部队)
俘获敌之印鍳,足见其狼狈不堪矣
8A(第八军)刘君立赠
于怒江西岸阴登山
八、二三
(注:这是中国人送给美国老兵的。陈一匡说,“刘君立”是第八军的参谋。)